Relying Party Solution

This section describes how a remote Relying Party or a Verifier App requests to a Wallet Instance the presentation of the PID/EAAs.

In this section the following flows are described:

  • Remote Flow, where the User presents a Credential to a remote Relying Party according to OpenID4VP Draft 20. In this scenario the user-agent and the Wallet Instance can be used in the same device (Same Device Flow), or in different devices (Cross Device Flow).

  • Proximity Flow, where the User presents a Credential to a Verifier App according to ISO 18013-5. The User interacts with a Verifier using proximity connection technologies such as QR Code and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE).

Remote Flow

In this flow the Relying Party MUST provide the URL where the signed presentation Request Object is available for download.

Depending on whether the User is using a mobile device or a workstation, the Relying Party MUST support the following remote flows:

  • Same Device, the Relying Party MUST provide a HTTP redirect (302) location to the Wallet Instance;

  • Cross Device, the Relying Party MUST provide a QR Code which the User frames with the Wallet Instance.

Once the Wallet Instance establishes the trust with the Relying Party and evaluates the request, the User gives the consent for the disclosure of the Digital Credentials, in the form of a Verifiable Presentation.

A High-Level description of the remote flow, from the User's perspective, is given below:

  1. the Wallet Instance obtains an URL in the Same Device flow or a QR Code containing the URL in Cross Device flow;

  2. the Wallet Instance extracts from the payload the following parameters: client_id, request_uri, state, request_uri_method and client_id_scheme;

  3. If the client_id_scheme is provided and set with the value entity_id, the Wallet Instance MUST collect and validate the OpenID Federation Trust Chain related to the Relying Party. If the client_id_scheme is either not provided or is assigned a value different from entity_id, the Wallet Instance MUST establish the trust by utilizing the client_id or an alternative client_id_scheme value. This alternative value MUST enable the Wallet Instance to establish trust with the Relying Party, ensuring compliance with the assurance levels mandated by the trust framework;

  4. If request_uri_method is provided and set with the value post, the Wallet Instance SHOULD transmit its metadata to the Relying Party's request_uri endpoint using the HTTP POST method and obtain the signed Request Object. If request_uri_method is set with the value get or not present, the Wallet Instance MUST fetch the signed Request Object using an HTTP request with method GET to the endpoint provided in the request_uri parameter;

  5. the Wallet Instance verifies the signature of the signed Request Object, using the public key identifier within the Request Object JWT header parameter to select the correct public key obtained within Trust Chain related to the RP;

  6. the Wallet Instance verifies that the client_id contained in the Request Object issuer (RP) matches with the one obtained at the step number 2 and with the sub parameter contained in the RP's Entity Configuration within the Trust Chain;

  7. the Wallet Instance evaluates the requested Digital Credentials and checks the elegibility of the Relying Party in asking these by applying the policies related to that specific Relying Party, obtained with the trust chain;

  8. the Wallet Instance asks User disclosure and consent by showing the Relying Party's identity and the requested attributes;

  9. the Wallet Instance presents the requested information to the Relying Party along with the Wallet Attestation. The Relying Party validates the presented Credentials checking the trust with their Issuers, and validates the Wallet Attestation by also checking that the Wallet Provider is trusted;

  10. the Wallet Instance informs the User about the successfull authentication with the Relying Party, the User continues the navigation.

Below a sequence diagram that summarizes the interactions between all the involved parties.

_images/cross_device_auth_seq_diagram.svg

Fig. 5 Remote Protocol Flow

The details of each step shown in the previous picture are described in the table below.

Id

Description

1, 2

The User requests to access to a protected resource of the Relying Party.

3, 4,

The Relying Party provides the Wallet Instance with a URL where the information about the Relying Party are provided, along with the information about where the signed request is available for download.

5, 6, 7, 8, 9

In the Cross Device Flow, the Request URI is presented as a QR Code displayed to the User. The User scans the QR Code using the Wallet Instance, which retrieves a URL with the parameters client_id, request_uri, state, client_id_scheme, and request_uri_method. Conversely, in the Same Device Flow, the Relying Party supplies identical information as in the Cross-Device flow, but directly through a URL provided with an href in an html page or a HTTP Redirect (302) response.

10,

The Wallet Instance evaluates the trust with the Relying Party.

11, 12

The Wallet Instance checks if the Relying Party has provided the request_uri_method within its signed Request Object. If provided and it is equal to post, the Wallet Instance provides its metadata to the Relying Party. The Relying Party returns a signed Request Object compliant to the Wallet technical capabilities.

13

When the Wallet Instance capabilities discovery is not supported by Relying Party, the Wallet Instance request the signed Request Object using the HTTP method GET.

14

The RP issues the Request Object signin it using one of its cryptographic private keys, where their public parts have been published within its Entity Configuration (metadata.wallet_relying_party.jwks). The Wallet Instance obtains the signed Request Object.

15, 16, 17

The Request Object, in the form of signed JWT, is verified by the Wallet Instance. The Wallet Instance processes the Relying Party metadata and applies the policies related to the Relying Party, attesting whose Digital Credentials and User data the Relying Party is granted to request.

18, 19

The Wallet Instance requests the User's consent for the release of the Credentials by showing the Relying Party's identity and the requested attributes. The User authorizes and consents the presentation of the Credentials by selecting/deselecting the personal data to release.

20

The Wallet Instance provides the Authorization Response to the Relying Party using an HTTP request with the method POST (response mode "direct_post.jwt").

21, 22, 23, 24, 25

The Relying Party verifies the Authorization Response, extracts the Wallet Attestation to establish the trust with the Wallet Solution. The Relying Party extracts the Digital Credentials and attests the trust to the Credentials Issuer and the proof of possession of the Wallet Instance about the presented Digital Credentials. Finally, the Relying Party verifies the revocation status of the presented Digital Credentials.

26

The Relying Party provides to the Wallet Instance the response about the presentation.

27, 28 and 29

The User is informed by the Wallet Instance that the Autentication succeded, then the protected resource is made available to the User.

Request URI with HTTP POST

The Relying Party SHOULD provide the POST method with its request_uri endpoint allowing the Wallet Instance to inform the Relying Party about its technical capabilities.

This feature can be useful when, for example, the Wallet Instance supports a restricted set of features, supported algorithms or a specific url for its authorization_endpoint, and any other information that it deems necessary to provide to the Relying Party for better interoperability.

Warning

The Wallet Instance, when providing its technical capabilities to the Relying Party, MUST NOT include any User information or other explicit information regarding the hardware used or usage preferences of its User.

If both the Relying Party and the Wallet Instance support the request_uri_method with HTTP POST, the Wallet Instance capabilities (metadata) MUST be provided using an HTTP request to the request_uri endpoint of the Relying Party, with the method POST and content type set to application/json.

A non-normative example of the HTTP request is represented below:

POST /request-uri HTTP/1.1
HOST: relying-party.example.org
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "authorization_endpoint": "https://wallet-solution.digital-strategy.europa.eu/authorization",
    "response_types_supported": [
      "vp_token"
    ],
    "response_modes_supported": [
      "form_post.jwt"
    ],
    "vp_formats_supported": {
      "vc+sd-jwt": {
          "sd-jwt_alg_values": [
              "ES256",
              "ES384"
          ]
      }
    },
    "request_object_signing_alg_values_supported": [
      "ES256"
    ],
    "presentation_definition_uri_supported": false
}

The response of the Relying Party is defined in the section below.

Authorization Request Details

The Relying Party MUST create a Request Object in the form of a signed JWT and MUST provide it to the Wallet Instance through an HTTP URL (request URI). The HTTP URL points to the web resource where the signed Request Object is available for download. The URL parameters contained in the Relying Party response, containing the request URI, are described in the Table below.

Name

Description

client_id

REQUIRED. Unique identifier of the Relying Party.

request_uri

REQUIRED. The HTTPs URL where the Relying Party provides the signed Request Object to the Wallet Instance.

client_id_scheme

OPTIONAL. The scheme used by the Relying Party for the client_id, detailing the format and structure and the trust evaluation method. It SHOULD be set with entity_id.

state

OPTIONAL. A unique identifier for the current transaction generated by the Relying Party. The value SHOULD be opaque to the Wallet Instance.

request_uri_method

OPTIONAL. The HTTP method MUST be set with get or post. The Wallet Instance should use this method to obtain the signed Request Object from the request_uri. If not provided or equal to get, the Wallet Instance SHOULD use the HTTP method get. Otherwise, the Wallet Instance SHOULD provide its metadata within the HTTP POST body encoded in application/json.

Below a non-normative example of the response containing the required parameters previously described.

https://wallet-solution.digital-strategy.europa.eu/authorization?client_id=...&request_uri=...&client_id_scheme=entity_id&request_uri_method=post

The value corresponding to the request_uri endpoint SHOULD be randomized, according to RFC 9101, The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT-Secured Authorization Request (JAR) Section 5.2.1.

In the Same Device Flow the Relying Party uses an HTTP response redirect (with status code set to 302) or an html page with an href button, containing the URL represented in the following non-normative example:

HTTP/1.1 /authorization Found
Location: https://wallet-solution.digital-strategy.europa.eu?
client_id=https%3A%2F%2Frelying-party.example.org%2Fcb
&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Frelying-party.example.org%2Frequest_uri
&client_id_scheme=entity_id
&request_uri_method=post

In the Cross Device Flow, a QR Code is shown by the Relying Party to the User in order to provide the Authorization Request. The User frames the QR Code using their Wallet Instance.

Below is represented a non-normative example of a QR Code issued by the Relying Party.

_images/verifier_qr_code.svg

Below is represented a non-normative example of the QR Code raw payload:

https://wallet-solution.digital-strategy.europa.eu/authorization?client_id=https%3A%2F%2Frelying-party.example.org&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Frelying-party.example.org&client_id_scheme=entity_id&request_uri_method=post

Note

The error correction level chosen for the QR Code MUST be Q (Quartily - up to 25%), since it offers a good balance between error correction capability and data density/space. This level of quality and error correction allows the QR Code to remain readable even if it is damaged or partially obscured.

Device Flow Status Checks and Security

Be the flow Same Device or Cross Device, the user-agent needs to check the session status to the endpoint made available by Relying Party (status endpoint). This check MAY be implemented in the form of JavaScript code, within the page that shows the QRCode or the href button pointing to the request URL. The JavaScript code makes the user-agent check the status endpoint using a polling strategy in seconds or a push strategy (eg: web socket).

Whatever Device Flow is detected by the Relying Party (eg: by inspecting the user-agent), the page using the JavaScript code inspecting the status endpoint is always returned to the user-agent.

In the Cross Device Flow the html page that checks the status endpoint also contains the QR Code. Using the Same Device Flow, the page that checks the status endpoint contains an href button or http-equiv meta header parameter, redirecting to the URL defined at the section "Authorization Request Details".

Since the html page and the status endpoint are implemented by the Relying Party, it is under the Relying Party responsability the implementation details of this solution, because this is related to the Relying Party's internal API. However, the text below describes an implementation example.

The Relying Party binds the request of the user-agent, with a session cookie marked as Secure and HttpOnly, with the issued request. The request url SHOULD include a parameter with a random value. The HTTP response returned by this status endpoint MAY contain the HTTP status codes listed below:

  • 201 Created. The signed Request Object was issued by the Relying Party that waits to be downloaded by the Wallet Instance at the request_uri endpoint.

  • 202 Accepted. This response is given when the signed Request Object was obtained by the Wallet Instance.

  • 200 OK. The Wallet Instance has provided the presentation to the Relying Party's response_uri endpoint and the User authentication is successful. The Relying Party updates the session cookie allowing the user-agent to access to the protected resource. An URL is provided carrying the location where the user-agent is intended to navigate.

  • 401 Unauthorized. The Wallet Instance or its User have rejected the request, or the request is expired. The QRCode page SHOULD be updated with an error message.

Below a non-normative example of the HTTP Request to the status endpoint, where the parameter id contains an opaque and random value:

GET /session-state?id=3be39b69-6ac1-41aa-921b-3e6c07ddcb03
HTTP/1.1
HOST: relying-party.example.org

When the status endpoint returns 200 OK, it means that the User authentication is successful and the JavaScript code will use the returned location where the user-agent will be redirect to continue the navigation.

Request Object Details

Below a non-normative example of HTTP request made by the Wallet Instance to the Relying Party.

GET /request_uri HTTP/1.1
HOST: relying-party.example.org

Request URI Response

The Relying Party issues the signed Request Object using the content type set to application/oauth-authz-req+jwt, where a non-normative example in the form of decoded header and payload is shown below:

{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "typ": "oauth-authz-req+jwt",
  "kid": "9tjiCaivhWLVUJ3AxwGGz_9",
  "trust_chain": [
    "MIICajCCAdOgAwIBAgIC...awz",
    "MIICajCCAdOgAwIBAgIC...2w3",
    "MIICajCCAdOgAwIBAgIC...sf2"
  ]
}
.
{
  "scope": "PersonIdentificationData WalletAttestation",
  "client_id_scheme": "entity_id",
  "client_id": "https://relying-party.example.org",
  "response_mode": "direct_post.jwt",
  "response_type": "vp_token",
  "response_uri": "https://relying-party.example.org/response_uri",
  "nonce": "2c128e4d-fc91-4cd3-86b8-18bdea0988cb",
  "state": "3be39b69-6ac1-41aa-921b-3e6c07ddcb03",
  "iss": "https://relying-party.example.org",
  "iat": 1672418465,
  "exp": 1672422065,
  "request_uri_method": "post"
}

The JWT header parameters are described below:

Name

Description

alg

Algorithm used to sign the JWT, according to [RFC 7516#section-4.1.1]. It MUST be one of the supported algorithms in Section Cryptographic Algorithms and MUST NOT be set to none or to a symmetric algorithm (MAC) identifier.

typ

Media Type of the JWT, as defined in [RFC 7519] and [RFC 9101]. It SHOULD be set to the value oauth-authz-req+jwt.

kid

Key ID of the public key needed to verify the JWT signature, as defined in [RFC 7517]. REQUIRED when trust_chain is used.

trust_chain

Sequence of Entity Statements that composes the Trust Chain related to the Relying Party, as defined in OID-FED Section 3.2.1. Trust Chain Header Parameter.

The JWT payload parameters are described herein:

Name

Description

scope

Aliases for well-defined Presentation Definitions IDs. It is used to identify which required Credentials and User attributes are requested by the Relying Party, according to the Section "Using scope Parameter to Request Verifiable Credential(s)" of [OID4VP].

client_id_scheme

String identifying the scheme of the value in the client_id. It MUST be set to the value entity_id.

client_id

Unique Identifier of the Relying Party.

response_mode

It MUST be set to direct_post.jwt.

response_type

It MUST be set to vp_token.

response_uri

The Response URI to which the Wallet Instance MUST send the Authorization Response using an HTTP request using the method POST.

nonce

Fresh cryptographically random number with sufficient entropy, which length MUST be at least 32 digits.

state

Unique identifier of the Authorization Request.

iss

The entity that has issued the JWT. It will be populated with the Relying Party client id.

iat

Unix Timestamp, representing the time at which the JWT was issued.

exp

Unix Timestamp, representing the expiration time on or after which the JWT MUST NOT be valid anymore.

request_uri_method

String determining the HTTP method to be used with the request_uri endpoint to provide the Wallet Instance metadata to the Relying Party. The value is case-insensitive and can be set to: get or post. The GET method, as defined in [@RFC9101], involves the Wallet Instance sending a GET request to retrieve a Request Object. The POST method involves the Wallet Instance requesting the creation of a new Request Object by sending an HTTP POST request, with its metadata, to the request URI of the Relying Party.

Warning

Using the parameter scope requires that the Relying Party Metadata MUST contain the presentation_definition, where a non-normative example of it is given below:

{
    "id": "presentation definitions",
    "input_descriptors": [
        {
			"id": "eu.europa.ec.eudiw.pid.it.1",
            "name": "Person Identification Data",
            "purpose": "User authentication",
			"group": [
                "group1"
            ],
			"format": {
                "vc+sd-jwt": {
                    "alg": [
                        "ES256",
                        "ES384",
                        "ES512"
                    ]
                }
            },
            "constraints": {
                "limit_disclosure": "preferred",
                "fields": [
                    {
                        "filter": {
                            "const": "unique_id",
                            "type": "string"
                        },
                        "path": [
                            "$.credentialSubject.unique_id"
                        ]
                    },
                    {
                        "filter": {
                            "const": "given_name",
                            "type": "string"
                        },
                        "path": [
                            "$.credentialSubject.given_name"
                        ]
                    },
                    {
                        "filter": {
                            "const": "family_name",
                            "type": "string"
                        },
                        "path": [
                            "$.credentialSubject.family_name"
                        ]
                    },
                    {
                        "filter": {
                            "const": "bith_date",
                            "type": "string"
                        },
                        "path": [
                            "$.credentialSubject.bith_date"
                        ]
                    },
                    {
                        "filter": {
                            "const": "tax_id_code",
                            "type": "string"
                        },
                        "path": [
                            "$.credentialSubject.tax_id_code"
                        ]
                    }
                ]
            }
        },
        {
			"id": "WalletAttestation",
            "name": "Wallet Attestation",
            "purpose": "Wallet Authentication",
			"format": "jwt",
            "group": [
                "group2"
            ],
            "constraints": {
                "fields": [
                    {
                        "filter": {
                            "enum": [
                                "https://issuer.example.org"
                            ],
                            "type": "string"
                        },
                        "path": [
                            "$.iss"
                        ]
                    },
                    {
                        "filter": {
                            "minimum": 1504700136,
                            "type": "number"
                        },
                        "path": [
                            "$.exp"
                        ]
                    },
                    {
                        "filter": {
                            "minimum": 1504700136,
                            "type": "number"
                        },
                        "path": [
                            "$.iat"
                        ]
                    },
                    {
                        "filter": {
                            "type": "object"
                        },
                        "path": [
                            "$.cnf.jwk"
                        ]
                    },
                    {
                        "filter": {
                            "const": "aal",
                            "type": "string"
                        },
                        "path": [
                            "$.aal"
                        ]
                    }
                ]
            }
        }
    ],
    "submission_requirements": [
        {
			"name": "Sample requirement",
            "count": 1,
			"rule": "pick",
            "from": "group1"
        }
    ]
}

Note

The following parameters, even if defined in [OID4VP], are not mentioned in the previous non-normative example, since their usage is conditional and may change in future release of this documentation.

  • presentation_definition: JSON object according to Presentation Exchange. This parameter MUST not be present when presentation_definition_uri or scope are present.

  • presentation_definition_uri: Not supported. String containing an HTTPS URL pointing to a resource where a Presentation Definition JSON object can be retrieved. This parameter MUST be present when presentation_definition parameter or a scope value representing a Presentation Definition is not present.

  • client_metadata: A JSON object containing the Relying Party metadata values. If the client_metadata parameter is present when client_id_scheme is entity_id, the Wallet Instance MUST consider the client metadata obtained through the OpenID Federation Trust Chain.

Request URI Endpoint Errors

When the Relying Party encounters errors while issuing the Request Object from the request_uri endpoint, the following error responses are applicable:

  • invalid_request: The request_uri URL is missing in some part within its webpath or urlparams, therefore it does not point to a valid Request Object and then it cannot be retrieved. This error is returned when the Request Object is not well referenced in the request_uri.

  • server_error: The server encountered an unexpected condition that prevented it from fulfilling the request. This error is returned when the Relying Party's server is unable to process the Request Object due to a server-side issue, such as a malfunction or maintenance. The Wallet Instance should advise the User to try again later.

The following is an example of an error response from request_uri endpoint:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json

{
 "error": "invalid_request",
 "error_description": "The request_uri is malformed or does not point to a valid Request Object."
}

Another example:

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Content-Type: application/json

{
 "error": "server_error",
 "error_description": "The request_uri cannot be retrieved due to an internal server error."
}

There are cases where the Wallet Instance cannot validate the Request Object or the Request Object results invalid. This error occurs if the Request Object is successfully fetched from the request_uri but fails validation checks by the Wallet Instance. This could be due to incorrect signatures, malformed claims, or other validation failures, such as the revocation of its issuer (Relying Party).

Upon receiving an error response, the Wallet Instance SHOULD inform the User of the error condition in an appropriate manner. Additionally, the Wallet Instance SHOULD log the error and MAY attempt to recover from certain errors if feasible. For example, if the error is server_error, the Wallet Instance MAY prompt the User to re-enter or scan a new QR code, if applicable.

It is crucial for Wallet Instances to implement robust error handling to maintain a secure and user-friendly experience. Adhering to the specified error responses ensures interoperability and helps in diagnosing issues during the interaction with the Relying Party's endpoints.

Warning

The current OpenID4VP specification outlines various error responses that a Wallet Instance may return to the Relying Party (Verifier) in case of faulty requests (OpenID4VP, Section 6.4. Error Response). For privacy enhancement, Wallet Instances SHOULD NOT notify the Relying Party of faulty requests in certain scenarios. This is to prevent any potential misuse of error responses that could lead to gather informations that could be exploited.

Authorization Response Details

After getting the User authorization and consent for the presentation of the Credentials, the Wallet Instance sends the Authorization Response to the Relying Party response_uri endpoint, the content SHOULD be encrypted according OpenID4VP Section 6.3, using the Relying Party public key.

Note

Why the response is encrypted?

The response sent from the Wallet Instance to the Relying Party is encrypted to prevent a malicious agent from gaining access to the plaintext information transmitted within the Relying Party's network. This is only possible if the network environment of the Relying Party employs TLS termination. Such technique employs a termination proxy that acts as an intermediary between the client and the webserver and handles all TLS-related operations. In this manner, the proxy deciphers the transmission's content and either forwards it in plaintext or by negotiates an internal TLS session with the actual webserver's intended target. In the first scenario, any malicious actor within the network segment could intercept the transmitted data and obtain sensitive information, such as an unencrypted response, by sniffing the transmitted data.

Below a non-normative example of the request:

POST /response_uri HTTP/1.1
HOST: relying-party.example.org
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

response=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...9t2LQ

Below is a non-normative example of the decrypted payload of the JWT contained in the response, before base64url encoding:

{
  "state": "3be39b69-6ac1-41aa-921b-3e6c07ddcb03",
  "vp_token": [
      "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...PT0iXX0",
      $WalletAttestation-JWT
  ],
  "presentation_submission": {
      "definition_id": "32f54163-7166-48f1-93d8-ff217bdb0653",
      "id": "04a98be3-7fb0-4cf5-af9a-31579c8b0e7d",
      "descriptor_map": [
          {
              "id": "PersonIdentificationData",
              "path": "$.vp_token[0]",
              "format": "vc+sd-jwt"
          },
          {
              "id": "WalletAttestation",
              "path": "$.vp_token[1]",
              "format": "wallet-attestation+jwt"
          }
      ]
  }
}

Where the following parameters are used:

Name

Description

vp_token

JSON Array containing the Verifiable Presentation(s). There MUST be at least two signed presentations in this Array:

  • The requested Digital Credential (one or more, in format of SD-JWT VC)

  • The Wallet Attestation

presentation_submission

JSON Object containing the mappings between the requested Verifiable Credentials and where to find them within the returned Verifiable Presentation Token, according to the Presentation Exchange. This is expressed via elements in the descriptor_map array (Input Descriptor Mapping Objects) that contain a field called path, which MUST have the value $ (top level root path) when only one Verifiable Presentation is contained in the VP Token, and MUST have the value $[n] (indexed path from root) when there are multiple Verifiable Presentations, where n is the index to select. The Relying Party receiving the presentation_submission descriptor therefore is able to use the correct method to decode each credential data format provided within the vp_token.

state

Unique identifier provided by the Relying Party within the Authorization Request.

The items contained in the vp_token array are Verifiable Presentations of Credentials.

SD-JWT Presentation

SD-JWT defines how an Holder can present a Credential to a Verifier proving the legitimate possession of the Credential. For doing this the Holder MUST include the KB-JWT in the SD-JWT, by appending the KB-JWT at the end of the of the SD-JWT, as represented in the example below:

<Issuer-Signed-JWT>~<Disclosure 1>~<Disclosure 2>~...~<Disclosure N>~<KB-JWT>

To validate the signature on the Key Binding JWT, the Verifier MUST use the key material included in the Issuer-Signed-JWT. The Key Binding JWT (KB-JWT) signature validation MUST use the public key included in the SD-JWT, using the cnf parameter contained in the Issuer-Signed-JWT.

When an SD-JWT is presented, its KB-JWT MUST contain the following parameters in the JWT header:

Claim

Description

typ

REQUIRED. MUST be kb+jwt, which explicitly types the Key Binding JWT as recommended in Section 3.11 of [RFC8725].

alg

REQUIRED. Signature Algorithm using one of the specified in the section Cryptographic Algorithms.

When an SD-JWT is presented, the KB-JWT signature MUST be verified by the same public key included in the SD-JWT within the cnf parameter. The KB-JWT MUST contain the following parameters in the JWT payload:

Claim

Description

iat

REQUIRED. The value of this claim MUST be the time at which the Key Binding JWT was issued, using the syntax defined in [RFC7519].

aud

REQUIRED. The intended receiver of the Key Binding JWT. The value of this parameter MUST match the Relying Party unique entity identifier.

nonce

REQUIRED. Ensures the freshness of the signature. The value type of this claim MUST be a string. The value MUST match with the one provided in the request object.

sd_hash

REQUIRED. The base64url-encoded hash digest over the Issuer-signed JWT and the selected disclosures.

Revocation Checks

The revocation mechanisms that the Relying Parties MUST implement are defined in the section (Revocations).

In the context of Digital Credential evaluation, any Relying Parties (RPs) establishes internal policies that define the meaning and value of presented Credentials. This is particularly important in scenarios where a Credential may be suspended but still holds value for certain purposes. For example, a suspended mobile driving license might still be valid for verifying the age of the holder.

The process begins with the RP requesting specific Credentials from the Holder. This request should align with the Relying Party's requirements and the context in which the Credentials will be used. The Holder then responds by releasing the requested Credentials.

Upon receiving the Credentials, the Relying Party evaluates their validity and value based on its internal policies. This evaluation considers the current status of the Credential (e.g., active, suspended, revoked) and the specific use case for which the Credential is being presented.

Relying Parties should develop comprehensive internal policies that outline how different types of Credentials are to be evaluated. These policies should address scenarios where a Credential may be partially valid or have limited applicability. Flexibility in evaluation processes is important to accommodate various use cases. For instance, a Credential that is suspended for driving purposes might still be acceptable for age verification.

Authorization Response Errors

When the Wallet sends a response using direct_post.jwt to the Relying Party, several errors may occur, including:

  • Invalid Credential: This error occurs when one or more Credentials or VPs, included in the vp_token, fail validation because they are malformed. The correct HTTP status code for this error is 400 (Bad Request). The error should be set to invalid_request, and the error_description SHOULD identify the malformed Credentials.

  • Issuer Credential Trust Failure: This error arises when the Relying Party cannot establish trust with the issuer of a presented Credential, included in the vp_token. The appropriate HTTP status code for this error is 403 (Forbidden). The error should be labeled as invalid_request, and the error_description SHOULD specify the issuer for which trust could not be established.

  • Invalid Nonce: This error happens when the nonce provided in the request is incorrect. The HTTP status code for this error should be 403 (Forbidden). The error SHOULD be labeled as invalid_request, with an error_description indicating that the nonce is incorrect.

  • Invalid Wallet Attestation: This error occours when it's not possible to establish trust with the Wallet Attestation's issuer (Wallet Provider), or if the Wallet Attestation is invalid or does not meet the Relying Party's minimum security criteria. The correct HTTP status code for this error is 403 (Forbidden). The error SHOULD be marked as invalid_request, and the error_description should clarify that the issue stems from the Wallet Attestation's failure to establish trust with its issuer or its non-compliance with required security standards.

  • Invalid Presentation Submission: This error occurs when the presentation submission is not valid. The appropriate HTTP status code for this error is 400 Bad Request. The error should be labeled as invalid_request, and the error_description should specify the invalid aspects of the presentation submission.

To enhance clarity and ensure proper error handling, it's crucial to provide detailed error responses. Below are two examples of HTTP responses using application/json that include both the error and error_description members:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "error": "invalid_request",
  "error_description": "Trust cannot be established with the issuer: https://issuer.example.com"
}

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "error": "invalid_request",
  "error_description": "The following Credentials/VP are malformed: [CredentialX, vp_token[2]]"
}

Redirect URI

When the Relying Party provides the redirect URI, the Wallet Instance MUST send the user-agent to this redirect URI. The redirect URI allows the Relying Party to continue the interaction with the End-User on the device where the Wallet Instance resides after the Wallet Instance has sent the Authorization Response to the response URI.

The Relying Party MUST include a response code within the redirect URI. The response code is a fresh, cryptographically random number used to ensure only the receiver of the redirect can fetch and process the Authorization Response. The number could be added as a path component, as a parameter or as a fragment to the URL. It is RECOMMENDED to use a cryptographic random value of 128 bits or more at the time of the writing of this specification.

The following is a non-normative example of the response from the Relying Party to the Wallet Instance upon receiving the Authorization Response at the Response Endpoint.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "redirect_uri": "https://relying-party.example.org/cb?response_code=091535f699ea575c7937fa5f0f454aee"
}

The redirect_uri value MUST be used with an HTTP method GET by either the Wallet Instance or the user-agent to redirect the User to the Relying Party in order to complete the process. The value can be added as a path component, as a fragment or as a parameter to the URL according to Section 6.2 of OpenID4VP. The specific entity that performs this action depends on whether the flow is Same device or Cross device.

Redirect URI Errors

When the Wallet Instance sends the user-agent to the Redirect URI provided by the Relying Party, several errors may occur that prevent the successful completion of the process. These errors are critical as they directly impact the User experience by hindering the seamless flow of information between the Wallet Instance and the Relying Party. Below are potential errors related to the Redirect URI and their implications:

  • Mismatched Redirect URI: This error occurs when the Redirect URI provided by the Relying Party does not match any of the URIs linked with the User session. This mismatch can lead to a HTTP status error code set to 403 (Forbidden), indicating that the request cannot be processed due session/URI mismatch.

  • Redirect URI Security Issues: If the Relying Party incurs in security issues when evaluating the User session with the provided URI, the Relying Party MUST raise an error. In such cases, an HTTP status code set to 403 (Forbidden) MUST be returned, indicating that the request is valid but the server is refusing action due to security precautions.

Handling these errors requires clear communication to the User within the returned navigation web page. It is crucial for the Relying Party to implement robust error handling and validation mechanisms for Redirect URIs to ensure a secure implementation.

Proximity Flow

This section describes how a Verifier requests the presentation of an mDoc-CBOR Credential to a Wallet Instance according to the ISO 18013-5 Specification. Only Supervised Device Retrieval flow is supported in this technical implementation profile.

The presentation phase is divided into three sub-phases:

1. Device Engagement: This subphase begins when the User is prompted to disclose certain attributes from the mDoc(s). The objective of this subphase is to establish a secure communication channel between the Wallet Instance and the Verifier App, so that the mDoc requests and responses can be exchanged during the communication subphase. The messages exchanged in this subphase are transmitted through short-range technologies to limit the possibility of interception and eavesdropping. This technical implementation profile exclusively supports QR code for Device Engagement.

2. Session establishment: During the session establishment phase, the Verifier App sets up a secure connection. All data transmitted over this connection is encrypted using a session key, which is known to both the Wallet Instance and the Verifier at this stage. The established session MAY be terminated based on the conditions as detailed in [ISO18013-5#9.1.1.4].

3. Communication - Device Retrieval: The Verifier App encrypts the mDoc request with the appropriate session key and sends it to the Wallet Instance together with its public key in a session establishment message. The mDoc uses the data from the session establishment message to derive the session key and decrypt the mDoc request. During the communication subphase, the Verifier App has the option to request information from the Wallet using mDoc requests and responses. The primary mode of communication is the secure channel established during the session setup. The Wallet Instance encrypts the mDoc response using the session key and transmits it to the Verifier App via a session data message. This technical implementation profile only supports Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) for the communication sub-phase.

The following figure illustrates the flow diagram compliant with ISO 18013-5 for proximity flow.

_images/High-Level-Flow-ITWallet-Presentation-ISO.svg

Fig. 6 High-Level Proximity Flow

Step 1-3: The Verifier requests the User to reveal certain attributes from their mDoc(s) stored in the Wallet Instance. The User initiates the Wallet Instance. The Wallet Instance MUST create a new temporary key pair (EDeviceKey.Priv, EDeviceKey.Pub), and incorporate the cipher suite identifier, the identifier of the elliptic curve for key agreement, and the EDeviceKey public point into the device engagement structure (refer to [ISO18013-5#9.1.1.4]). This key pair is temporary and MUST be invalidated immediately after the secure channel is established. Finally, the Wallet Instance displays the QR Code for Device Engagement.

Below an example of a device engagement structure that utilizes QR for device engagement and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) for data retrieval.

CBOR data:

a30063312e30018201d818584ba4010220012158205a88d182bce5f42efa59943f33359d2e8a968ff289d93e5fa444b624343167fe225820b16e8cf858ddc7690407ba61d4c338237a8cfcf3de6aa672fc60a557aa32fc670281830201a300f401f50b5045efef742b2c4837a9a3b0e1d05a6917

In diagnostic notation:

{
  0: "1.0", % Version

  1:        % Security
  [
      1,     % defines the cipher suite 1 which contains only EC curves
      24(<<  % embedded CBOR data item
        {
          1: 2, % kty:EC2 (Elliptic curves with x and y coordinate pairs)
        -1: 1, % crv:p256
-2:h'5A88D182BCE5F42EFA59943F33359D2E8A968FF289D93E5FA444B624343  167FE',% x-coordinate
-3:h'B16E8CF858DDC7690407BA61D4C338237A8CFCF3DE6AA672FC60A557AA32FC67' % y-coordinate
        }
      >>)
    ],

    2: %DeviceRetrievalMethods(Device engagement using QR code)
    [
      [
        2, %BLE
        1, % Version
      {    %BLE options
          0: false, % no support for mdoc peripheral server mode
          1: true, % support mdoc central client mode
          11: h'45EFEF742B2C4837A9A3B0E1D05A6917' % UUID of mdoc client central mode
        }
      ]
    ]
}

Step 4-6: The Verifier App scans the QR Code and generates its own ephemeral key pair (EReaderKey.Priv, EReaderKey.Pub). It then calculates the session key, using the public key received in the Engagement Structure and its newly-generated private key, as outlined in [ISO18013-5#9.1.1.5]. Finally, it generates its session key, which must be independently derived by both the Wallet Instance and the Verifier App.

Step 7: The Verifier App creates an mDoc request that MUST be encrypted using the relevant session key, and transmits it to the Wallet Instance along with EReaderKey.Pub within a session establishment message. The mDoc request MUST be encoded in CBOR, as demonstrated in the following non-normative example.

CBOR data: .. code-block:

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

The above CBOR data is represented in diagnostic notation as follows: .. code-block:

{
  "version": "1.0",
  "docRequests": [
  {
    "itemsRequest": 24(<< {
      "docType": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL",
      "nameSpaces": {
        "org.iso.18013.5.1.IT": {
          "verification.evidence": false,
          "verification.assurance_level": false,
          "verification.trust_framework": false
        },
        "org.iso.18013.5.1": {
          "un_distinguishing_sign": false,
          "driving_privileges": false,
          "document_number": false,
          "issue_date": false,
          "issuing_country": false,
          "issuing_authority": false,
          "birth_date": false,
          "expiry_date": false,
          "given_name": false,
          "portrait": false,
          "family_name": false
        }
      }
    } >>),
    "readerAuth": [
      h'a10126',
      {
        33: h'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'
      },
      null,
      h'58a0d421a7e53b7db0412a196fea50ca6d4c8a530a47dd84d88588ab145374bd0ab2a724cf2ed2facf32c7184591c5969efd53f5aba63194105440bc1904e1b9'
    ]
  }
  ]
}

Step 8: The Wallet Instance uses the session establishment message to derive the session keys and decrypt the mDoc request. It computes the session key using the public key received from the Verifier App and its private key.

Step 9-10: When the Wallet Instance receives the mDoc request, it locates the documents that contain the requested attributes and asks the User for permission to provide this information to the Verifier. If the User agrees, the Wallet generates an mDoc response and transmits it to the Verifier App through the secure channel.

Step 11-12: If the User gives consent, the Wallet Instance creates an mDoc response and transmits it to the Verifier App via the secure channel. The mDoc response MUST be encoded in CBOR, with its structure outlined in [ISO18013-5#8.3.2.1.2.2]. Below is a non-normative example of an mDoc response.

CBOR Data: .. code-block:

a36776657273696f6e63312e3069646f63756d656e747381a367646f6354797065756f72672e69736f2e31383031332e352e312e6d444c6c6973737565725369676e6564a26a6e616d65537061636573a2746f72672e69736f2e31383031332e352e312e495483d81858f7a46864696765737449440b6672616e646f6d506d44f21ee875f2c1d502b43198e5a15271656c656d656e744964656e74696669657275766572696669636174696f6e2e65766964656e63656c656c656d656e7456616c756581a2647479706571656c656374726f6e69635f7265636f7264667265636f7264bf6474797065781f68747470733a2f2f657564692e77616c6c65742e70646e642e676f762e697466736f75726365bf716f7267616e697a6174696f6e5f6e616d65754d6f746f72697a7a617a696f6e6520436976696c656f6f7267616e697a6174696f6e5f6964656d5f696e666c636f756e7472795f636f6465626974ffffd8185866a4686469676573744944046672616e646f6d50185d84dfb71ce9b173010ddd62174fbe71656c656d656e744964656e746966696572781c766572696669636174696f6e2e74727573745f6672616d65776f726b6c656c656d656e7456616c7565656569646173d8185865a4686469676573744944006672616e646f6d50137f903174253c4585358267aae2ea4e71656c656d656e744964656e746966696572781c766572696669636174696f6e2e6173737572616e63655f6c6576656c6c656c656d656e7456616c75656468696768716f72672e69736f2e31383031332e352e318bd8185852a46864696765737449440c6672616e646f6d5053e29d0ddbbc7d2306a32bdbe2e56e5171656c656d656e744964656e7469666965726b66616d696c795f6e616d656c656c656d656e7456616c756563446f65d8185855a4686469676573744944036672616e646f6d50990cba2069fa1b33b8d6ae910b6549dc71656c656d656e744964656e7469666965726a676976656e5f6e616d656c656c656d656e7456616c756567416e746f6e696fd818585ba46864696765737449440a6672616e646f6d504086c1379975f805f1b1f4975e6a126571656c656d656e744964656e7469666965726a69737375655f646174656c656c656d656e7456616c7565d903ec6a323031392d31302d3230d818585ca4686469676573744944016672616e646f6d50ab4ca30c918dd2fd0bf35242c15fa2d871656c656d656e744964656e7469666965726b6578706972795f646174656c656c656d656e7456616c7565d903ec6a323032342d31302d3230d8185855a4686469676573744944076672616e646f6d508d9066f6c8da16619867cd4e2fab0c8871656c656d656e744964656e7469666965726f69737375696e675f636f756e7472796c656c656d656e7456616c7565624954d818587ea4686469676573744944056672616e646f6d5059fe68db795dee4c20976380ea24770571656c656d656e744964656e7469666965727169737375696e675f617574686f726974796c656c656d656e7456616c75657828497374697475746f20506f6c696772616669636f2065205a656363612064656c6c6f20537461746fd818585ba4686469676573744944026672616e646f6d5008b3f1ca5517019767be3dee3bb0614571656c656d656e744964656e7469666965726a62697274685f646174656c656c656d656e7456616c7565d903ec6a313935362d30312d3230d818585ca4686469676573744944096672616e646f6d50a2395ec214350c26066306e23279b3ae71656c656d656e744964656e7469666965726f646f63756d656e745f6e756d6265726c656c656d656e7456616c756569393837363534333231d8185850a4686469676573744944066672616e646f6d50a25e1a5b915d2d6eafee9674e023293971656c656d656e744964656e74696669657268706f7274726169746c656c656d656e7456616c75654420212223d81858eea46864696765737449440d6672616e646f6d50eeed6a3b856563627589a360939d12f771656c656d656e744964656e7469666965727264726976696e675f70726976696c656765736c656c656d656e7456616c756582a37576656869636c655f63617465676f72795f636f646561416a69737375655f64617465d903ec6a323031382d30382d30396b6578706972795f64617465d903ec6a323032342d31302d3230a37576656869636c655f63617465676f72795f636f646561426a69737375655f64617465d903ec6a323031372d30322d32336b6578706972795f64617465d903ec6a323032342d31302d3230d818585ba4686469676573744944086672616e646f6d50c0ef486b2a194ed3cbf7f354fd40092171656c656d656e744964656e74696669657276756e5f64697374696e6775697368696e675f7369676e6c656c656d656e7456616c756561496a697373756572417574688443a10126a118215901423082013e3081e5a00302010202012a300a06082a8648ce3d040302301a3118301606035504030c0f5374617465204f662055746f706961301e170d3233313132343134353430345a170d3238313132323134353430345a30383136303406035504030c2d5374617465204f662055746f7069612049737375696e6720417574686f72697479205369676e696e67204b65793059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004c338ec1000b351ce8bcdfc167450aeceb

In diagnostic notation: .. code-block:

{
  "version": "1.0",
  "documents": [
  {
    "docType": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL",
    "issuerSigned": {
      "nameSpaces": {
        "org.iso.18013.5.1.IT": [
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 11,
            "random": h'6d44f21ee875f2c1d502b43198e5a152',
            "elementIdentifier": "verification.evidence",
            "elementValue": [
              {
                "type": "electronic_record",
                "record": {
                  "type": "https://eudi.wallet.pdnd.gov.it",
                  "source": {
                    "organization_name": "Motorizzazione Civile",
                    "organization_id": "m_inf",
                    "country_code": "it"
                  }
                }
              }
            ]
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 4,
            "random": h'185d84dfb71ce9b173010ddd62174fbe',
            "elementIdentifier": "verification.trust_framework",
            "elementValue": "eidas"
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 0,
            "random": h'137f903174253c4585358267aae2ea4e',
            "elementIdentifier": "verification.assurance_level",
            "elementValue": "high"
          } >>)
        ],
        "org.iso.18013.5.1": [
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 12,
            "random": h'53e29d0ddbbc7d2306a32bdbe2e56e51',
            "elementIdentifier": "family_name",
            "elementValue": "Doe"
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 3,
            "random": h'990cba2069fa1b33b8d6ae910b6549dc',
            "elementIdentifier": "given_name",
            "elementValue": "Antonio"
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 10,
            "random": h'4086c1379975f805f1b1f4975e6a1265',
            "elementIdentifier": "issue_date",
            "elementValue": 1004("2019-10-20")
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 1,
            "random": h'ab4ca30c918dd2fd0bf35242c15fa2d8',
            "elementIdentifier": "expiry_date",
            "elementValue": 1004("2024-10-20")
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 7,
            "random": h'8d9066f6c8da16619867cd4e2fab0c88',
            "elementIdentifier": "issuing_country",
            "elementValue": "IT"
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 5,
            "random": h'59fe68db795dee4c20976380ea247705',
            "elementIdentifier": "issuing_authority",
            "elementValue": "Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato"
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 2,
            "random": h'08b3f1ca5517019767be3dee3bb06145',
            "elementIdentifier": "birth_date",
            "elementValue": 1004("1956-01-20")
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 9,
            "random": h'a2395ec214350c26066306e23279b3ae',
            "elementIdentifier": "document_number",
            "elementValue": "987654321"
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 6,
            "random": h'a25e1a5b915d2d6eafee9674e0232939',
            "elementIdentifier": "portrait",
            "elementValue": h'20212223'
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 13,
            "random": h'eeed6a3b856563627589a360939d12f7',
            "elementIdentifier": "driving_privileges",
            "elementValue": [
              {
                "vehicle_category_code": "A",
                "issue_date": 1004("2018-08-09"),
                "expiry_date": 1004("2024-10-20")
              },
              {
                "vehicle_category_code": "B",
                "issue_date": 1004("2017-02-23"),
                "expiry_date": 1004("2024-10-20")
              }
            ]
          } >>),
          24(<< {
            "digestID": 8,
            "random": h'c0ef486b2a194ed3cbf7f354fd400921',
            "elementIdentifier": "un_distinguishing_sign",
            "elementValue": "I"
          } >>)
        ]
      },
      "issuerAuth": [
        h'a10126',
        {
          33: h'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'
        },
        24(<< {
      "version": "1.0",
      "digestAlgorithm": "SHA-256",
      "docType": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL",
      "valueDigests": {
        "org.iso.18013.5.1": {
        1: h'0E5F0B6B33418E508740771E82F893372EAF5B2445BC4C84DCF08B005E9493FC',
        2: h'DE21BB62FF2897D8B986D2CDA9F9BC5865C02807F7B4D9DD1FA4A79DF4C0D37F',
        3: h'BC5568239E35CE9FF8798C27FFDCD757B134B679F0FE05729AA3491381912E65',
        5: h'E6048BDC7FD6454296F1E3F54536107C9C5B24C4064DE46A98121E3630EECCA2',
        6: h'73690D92DCAA61B0203870F67C6AA9FDFEA889B6F0C720DE757B4B0A8516A206',
        7: h'E353EA0B0FD92B6BE90C64CC3B2EE1284153A8F0F5066B99AAC599200E6EEEB2',
        8: h'29227872CEB49923D267B5F4BADE6D387B42AC2DC4B2AE26C9013067FEE7018A',
        9: h'A6A119F7CACAC0B8C6AACAC747FD3FE7E50B6D9BB8A507FDA79F0DF6646F285D',
        10: h'6D8025D2F02A5E7E1406FB6AAEB67F9EDE9B07191A53F3E23B77C528223A94E2',
        12: h'B0D43E4E2EA534E4D5304E64BCF7A0F13E2C8EE8304B9CD23ABA4909652A4647',
        13: h'FBF4DE318982F2DBAD43C601CAEB22628B301AC18AA8264C5831B2AAAC89C486'
        },
        "org.iso.18013.5.1.IT": {
        0: h'CF57377B675F64F37314739592C1E8A911A7DDAF341CE2902FE877C5A835E4C1',
        4: h'4A4B4CC64EC9299C1A2501EA449F577005E9F7A60408057C07A7C67FB151E5F5',
        11: h'78824FBD6FBBA88A2AAB44DF8B6F5E9759126D87D1F4415995E658FD9239E1FE'
        }
      },
      "deviceKeyInfo": {
        "deviceKey": {
        1: 2,
        -1: 1,
        -2: h'AFD09E720B918CEDC2B8A881950BAB6A1051E18AE16A814D51E609938663D5E1',
        -3: h'61FBC6C8AD24EC86A78BB4E9AC377DD2B7C711D9F2EB9AFD4AA0963662847AED'}},
        "validityInfo": {
          "signed": 0("2023-11-24T14:54:05Z"),
          "validFrom": 0("2023-11-24T14:54:05Z"),
          "validUntil": 0("2024-11-24T14:54:05Z")}
        }  >>),
        h'f2461e4fab69e9f7bcffe552395424514524d1679440036213173101448d1b1ab4a293859b389ffa8b47aeed10e9b0c1545412ac37c51a76482cd9bbbe110152'
      ]
    },
    "deviceSigned": {
      "nameSpaces": 24(<< {} >>),
      "deviceAuth": {
        "deviceSignature": [
          h'a10126',
          {},
          null,
          h'1fed7190d2975ab79c072e6f1d9d52436059d1fc959d55baf74f057d89b10fcc0dc77a50d433d4c76ddf26223c5560c4ab123b5cb5eb805a90036aa147493076'
        ]
      }
    }
  }
  ],
  "status": 0
}

Step 13: The Verifier App is required to validate the signatures in the mDoc's issuerSigned field using the public key of the Credential Issuer specified within the mDoc. Subsequently, the Verifier MUST validate the signature in the deviceSigned field. If these signature checks pass, the Verifier can confidently consider the received information as valid.

Device Engagement

The Device Engagement structure MUST be have at least the following components:

  • Version: tstr. Version of the data structure being used.

  • Security: an array that contains two mandatory values

    • the cipher identifier: see Table 22 of [ISO18013-5]

    • the mDL public ephemeral key generated by the Wallet Instance and required by the Verifier App to derive the Session Key. The mDL public ephemeral key MUST be of a type allowed by the indicated cipher suite.

  • transferMethod: an array that contains one or more transferMethod arrays when performing device engagement using the QR code. This array is for offline data retrieval methods. A transferMethod array holds two mandatory values (type and version). Only the BLE option is supported by this technical implementation profile, then the type value MUST be set to 2.

  • BleOptions: this elements MUST provide options for the BLE connection (support for Peripheral Server or Central Client Mode, and the device UUID).

mDoc Request

The messages in the mDoc Request MUST be encoded using CBOR. The resulting CBOR byte string for the mDoc Request MUST be encrypted with the Session Key obtained after the Device Engagement phase and MUST be transmitted using the BLE protocol. The details on the structure of mDoc Request, including identifier and format of the data elements, are provided below.

  • version: (tstr). Version of the data structure.

  • docRequests: Requested DocType, NameSpace and data elements.

    • itemsRequest: #6.24(bstr .cbor ItemsRequest).

      • docType: (tstr). The DocType element contains the type of document requested. See Data Model Section.

      • nameSpaces: (tstr). See Data Model Section for more details.

        • dataElements: (tstr). Requested data elements with Intent to Retain value for each requested element.

          • IntentToRetain: (bool). It indicates that the Verifier App intends to retain the received data element.

    • readerAuth: COSE_Sign1. It is required for the Verifier App authentication.

Note

The domestic data elements MUST not be returned unless specifically requested by the Verifier App.

mDoc Response

The messages in the mDoc Response MUST be encoded using CBOR and MUST be encrypted with the Session Key obtained after the Device Engagement phase. The details on the structure of mDoc Response are provided below.

  • version: (tstr). Version of the data structure.

  • documents: Returned DocType, and ResponseData.

    • docType: (tstr). The DocType element contains the type of document returned. See Data Model Section.

    • ResponseData:

      • IssuerSigned: Responded data elements signed by the issuer.

        • nameSpaces: (tstr). See Data Model Section for more details.

          • IssuerSignedItemBytes: #6.24(bstr .cbor).

            • digestID: (uint). Reference value to one of the ValueDigests provided in the Mobile Security Object (issuerAuth).

            • random: (bstr). Random byte value used as salt for the hash function. This value SHALL be different for each IssuerSignedItem and it SHALL have a minimum length of 16 bytes.

            • elementIdentifier: (tstr). Identifier of User attribute name contained in the Credential.

            • elementValue: (any). User attribute value

      • DeviceSigned: Responded data elements signed by the Wallet Instance.

        • NameSpaces: #6.24(bstr .cbor DeviceNameSpaces). The DeviceNameSpaces structure MAY be an empty structure. DeviceNameSpaces contains the data element identifiers and values. It is returned as part of the corresponding namespace in DeviceNameSpace.

          • DataItemName: (tstr). The identifier of the element.

          • DataItemValue: (any). The value of the element.

        • DeviceAuth: The DeviceAuth structure MUST contain the DeviceSignature elements.

          • DeviceSignature: It MUST contain the device signature for the Wallet Instance authentication.

  • status: It contains a status code. For detailed description and action required refer to to Table 8 (ResponseStatus) of the [ISO18013-5]

Session Termination

The session MUST be terminated if at least one of the following conditions occur.

  • After a time-out of no activity of receiving or sending session establishment or session data messages occurs. The time-out for no activity implemented by the Wallet Instance and the Verifier App SHOULD be no less than 300 seconds.

  • When the Wallet Instance doesn't accept any more requests.

  • When the Verifier App does not send any further requests.

If the Wallet Instance and the Verifier App does not send or receive any further requests, the session termination MUST be initiated as follows.

  • Send the status code for session termination, or

  • dispatch the "End" command as outlined in [ISO18013-5#8.3.3.1.1.5].

When a session is terminated, the Wallet Instance and the Verifier App MUST perform at least the following actions:

  • destruction of session keys and related ephemeral key material;

  • closure of the communication channel used for data retrieval.