Remote Flow

In this flow the Relying Party MUST provide the URL where the signed presentation Request Object is available for download.

Depending on whether the User is using a mobile device or a workstation, the Relying Party MUST support the following remote flows:

  • Same Device, the Relying Party MUST provide a HTTP location to the Wallet Instance using a redirect (302) or an HTML href in a web page;

  • Cross Device, the Relying Party MUST provide a QR Code which the User frames with the Wallet Instance.

Once the Wallet Instance establishes the trust with the Relying Party and evaluates the request, the User gives the consent for the disclosure of the Digital Credentials, in the form of a Verifiable Presentation.

A High-Level description of the remote flow, from the User's perspective, is given below:

  1. the Wallet Instance obtains an URL in the Same Device flow or a QR Code containing the URL in Cross Device flow;

  2. the Wallet Instance extracts from the payload the following parameters: client_id, request_uri, state, request_uri_method;

  3. If request_uri_method is provided and set with the value post, the Wallet Instance SHOULD transmit its metadata to the Relying Party's request_uri endpoint using the HTTP POST method and obtain the signed Request Object. If request_uri_method is set with the value get or not present, the Wallet Instance MUST fetch the signed Request Object using an HTTP request with method GET to the endpoint provided in the request_uri parameter;

  4. the Wallet Instance verifies the signature of the signed Request Object using the public key identified in the JWT header of the Request Object. Using that reference, the Wallet Instance is able to select the correct RP's public key for signature verification;

  5. the Wallet Instance verifies that the client_id contained in the Request Object issuer (RP) matches with the one obtained at the step number 2 and with the sub parameter contained in the RP's Entity Configuration within the Trust Chain;

  6. the Wallet Instance evaluates the requested Digital Credentials and checks the elegibility of the Relying Party in asking these by applying the policies related to that specific Relying Party, obtained with the Trust Chain;

  7. the Wallet Instance asks User disclosure and consent by showing the Relying Party's identity and the requested attributes;

  8. the Wallet Instance presents the requested information to the Relying Party along with the Wallet Attestation. The Relying Party validates the presented Credentials checking the trust with their Issuers, and validates the Wallet Attestation by also checking that the Wallet Provider is trusted;

  9. the Wallet Instance informs the User about the successfull authentication with the Relying Party, the User continues the navigation.

Below a sequence diagram that summarizes the interactions between all the involved parties.

_images/cross_device_auth_seq_diagram.svg

Remote Protocol Flow

The details of each step shown in the previous picture are described in the table below.

Id

Description

1, 2

The User requests to access to a protected resource of the Relying Party.

3, 4,

The Relying Party provides the Wallet Instance with a URL where the information about the Relying Party are provided, along with the information about where the signed request is available for download.

5, 6, 7, 8, 9

In the Cross Device Flow, the Request URI is presented as a QR Code displayed to the User. The User scans the QR Code using the Wallet Instance, which retrieves a URL with the parameters client_id, request_uri, state and request_uri_method. Conversely, in the Same Device Flow, the Relying Party supplies identical information as in the Cross-Device flow, but directly through a URL provided with an href in an html page or a HTTP Redirect (302) response.

10,

The Wallet Instance evaluates the trust with the Relying Party.

11, 12

The Wallet Instance checks if the Relying Party has provided the request_uri_method within its signed Request Object. If provided and it is equal to post, the Wallet Instance provides its metadata to the Relying Party. The Relying Party returns a signed Request Object compliant to the Wallet technical capabilities.

13

When the Wallet Instance capabilities discovery is not supported by Relying Party, the Wallet Instance requests the signed Request Object using the HTTP method GET.

14

The RP issues the Request Object signin it using one of its cryptographic private keys, where their public parts have been published within its Entity Configuration (metadata.openid_credential_verifier.jwks). The Wallet Instance obtains the signed Request Object.

15, 16, 17

The Request Object, in the form of signed JWT, is verified by the Wallet Instance. The Wallet Instance processes the Relying Party metadata and applies the policies related to the Relying Party, attesting whose Digital Credentials and User data the Relying Party is granted to request.

18, 19

The Wallet Instance requests the User's consent for the release of the Credentials by showing the Relying Party's identity and the requested attributes. The User authorizes and consents the presentation of the Credentials by selecting/deselecting the personal data to release.

20

The Wallet Instance provides the Authorization Response to the Relying Party using an HTTP request with the method POST (response mode "direct_post.jwt").

21, 22, 23, 24, 25

The Relying Party verifies the Authorization Response, extracts the Wallet Attestation to establish the trust with the Wallet Solution. The Relying Party extracts the Digital Credentials and attests the trust to the Credentials Issuer and the proof of possession of the Wallet Instance about the presented Digital Credentials. Finally, the Relying Party verifies the revocation status of the presented Digital Credentials.

26 (Same Device) or 28 (Cross Device)

The Relying Party provides to the Wallet Instance the response about the presentation.

27 (Same Device) or 29 and 30 (Cross Device)

The authentication flow is completed by following the redirection URIs provided by Relying Party.

31

The User is informed by the Wallet Instance that the Autentication succeded, then the protected resource is made available to the User.

Request URI with HTTP POST

The Relying Party SHOULD provide the POST method with its request_uri endpoint allowing the Wallet Instance to inform the Relying Party about its technical capabilities.

This feature can be useful when, for example, the Wallet Instance supports a restricted set of features, supported algorithms or a specific url for its authorization_endpoint, and any other information that it deems necessary to provide to the Relying Party for interoperability.

Warning

The Wallet Instance, when providing its technical capabilities to the Relying Party, MUST NOT include any User information or other explicit information regarding the hardware used or usage preferences of its User.

If both the Relying Party and the Wallet Instance support the request_uri_method with HTTP POST, the Wallet Instance capabilities (metadata) MUST be provided using an HTTP request to the request_uri endpoint of the Relying Party, with the method POST and content type set to application/x-www-form-urlencoded.

A non-normative example of the request object encoded in JSON, prior to being encoded in application/x-www-form-urlencoded by the Wallet for the Relying Party.

{
  "wallet_metadata": {
    "authorization_endpoint": "https://wallet-solution.digital-strategy.europa.eu/authorization",
    "response_types_supported": [
      "vp_token"
    ],
    "response_modes_supported": [
      "form_post.jwt"
    ],
    "vp_formats_supported": {
      "dc+sd-jwt": {
          "sd-jwt_alg_values": [
              "ES256",
              "ES384"
          ]
      }
    },
    "request_object_signing_alg_values_supported": [
      "ES256"
    ],
    "presentation_definition_uri_supported": false,
    "client_id_schemes_supported": ["https"],
  },
  "wallet_nonce": "qPmxiNFCR3QTm19POc8u"
}

The response of the Relying Party is defined in the section below.

Authorization Request Details

The Relying Party MUST create a Request Object in the form of a signed JWT and MUST provide it to the Wallet Instance through an HTTP URL (request URI). The HTTP URL points to the web resource where the signed Request Object is available for download. The URL parameters contained in the Relying Party response, containing the request URI, are described in the Table below.

Name

Description

client_id

REQUIRED. Unique identifier of the Relying Party.

request_uri

REQUIRED. The HTTPs URL where the Relying Party provides the signed Request Object to the Wallet Instance.

state

RECOMMENDED. A unique identifier for the current transaction generated by the Relying Party. The value SHOULD be opaque to the Wallet Instance.

request_uri_method

OPTIONAL. The HTTP method MUST be set with get or post. The Wallet Instance should use this method to obtain the signed Request Object from the request_uri. If not provided or equal to get, the Wallet Instance SHOULD use the HTTP method get. Otherwise, the Wallet Instance SHOULD provide its metadata within the HTTP POST body encoded in application/x-www-form-urlencoded.

Warning

For security reasons and to prevent endpoint mix-up attacks, the value contained in the request_uri parameter MUST be one of those attested by a trusted third party, such as those provided in the openid_credential_verifier metadata within the request_uris parameter, obtained from the Trust Chain about the Relying Party.

Note

The state parameter in an OAuth request is optional, but it is highly recommended. It is primarily used to prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks by including a unique and unpredictable value that the Relying Party can verify upon receiving the response. Additionally, it helps maintain state between the request and response, such as session information or other data the Relying Party needs after the authorization process.

Below a non-normative example of the response containing the required parameters previously described.

https://wallet-solution.digital-strategy.europa.eu/authorization?client_id=...&request_uri=...&request_uri_method=post

The value corresponding to the request_uri endpoint SHOULD be randomized, according to RFC 9101, The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT-Secured Authorization Request (JAR) Section 5.2.1.

In the Same Device Flow the Relying Party uses an HTTP response redirect (with status code set to 302) or an html page with an href button, containing the URL represented in the following non-normative example:

HTTP/1.1 /authorization Found
Location: https://wallet-solution.digital-strategy.europa.eu?
client_id=https%3A%2F%2Frelying-party.example.org%2Fcb
&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Frelying-party.example.org%2Frequest_uri
&request_uri_method=post

In the Cross Device Flow, a QR Code is shown by the Relying Party to the User in order to provide the Authorization Request. The User frames the QR Code using their Wallet Instance.

Below is represented a non-normative example of a QR Code issued by the Relying Party.

_images/verifier_qr_code.svg

Below is represented a non-normative example of the QR Code raw payload:

https://wallet-solution.digital-strategy.europa.eu/authorization?client_id=https%3A%2F%2Frelying-party.example.org&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Frelying-party.example.org&request_uri_method=post

Note

The error correction level chosen for the QR Code MUST be Q (Quartily - up to 25%), since it offers a good balance between error correction capability and data density/space. This level of quality and error correction allows the QR Code to remain readable even if it is damaged or partially obscured.

Device Flow Status Checks and Security

This specification introduces the Relying Party Presentation Request Status Endpoint for implementations that want to use it, as this endpoint is an internal feature for the security of the implementation and is not required for interoperability.

Be the flow Same Device or Cross Device, the user-agent needs to check the session status to the endpoint made available by Relying Party (status endpoint). This check MAY be implemented in the form of JavaScript code, within the page that shows the QRCode or the href button pointing to the request URL. The JavaScript code makes the user-agent check the status endpoint using a polling strategy in seconds or a push strategy (eg: web socket).

Whatever Device Flow is detected by the Relying Party (eg: by inspecting the user-agent), the page using the JavaScript code inspecting the status endpoint is always returned to the user-agent.

In the Cross Device Flow the html page that checks the status endpoint also contains the QR Code. Using the Same Device Flow, the page that checks the status endpoint contains an href button or http-equiv meta header parameter, redirecting to the URL defined at the section "Authorization Request Details".

Since the html page and the status endpoint are implemented by the Relying Party, it is under the Relying Party responsability the implementation details of this solution, because this is related to the Relying Party's internal API. However, the text below describes an implementation example.

The Relying Party binds the request of the user-agent, with a session cookie marked as Secure and HttpOnly, with the issued request. The request url SHOULD include a parameter with a random value. The HTTP response returned by this status endpoint MAY contain the HTTP status codes listed below:

  • 201 Created. The signed Request Object was issued by the Relying Party that waits to be downloaded by the Wallet Instance at the request_uri endpoint.

  • 202 Accepted. This response is given when the signed Request Object was obtained by the Wallet Instance.

  • 200 OK. The Wallet Instance has provided the presentation to the Relying Party's response_uri endpoint and the User authentication is successful. The Relying Party updates the session cookie allowing the user-agent to access to the protected resource. An URL is provided carrying the location where the user-agent is intended to navigate.

  • 401 Unauthorized. The Wallet Instance or its User have rejected the request, or the request is expired. The QRCode page SHOULD be updated with an error message.

Below a non-normative example of the HTTP Request to the status endpoint, where the parameter id contains an opaque and random value:

GET /session-state?id=3be39b69-6ac1-41aa-921b-3e6c07ddcb03
HTTP/1.1
HOST: relying-party.example.org

When the status endpoint returns 200 OK, it means that the User authentication is successful and the JavaScript code will use the returned location where the user-agent will be redirect to continue the navigation.

Even if an adversary were to steal the random value used in the request to the status endpoint, their user-agent would be rejected due to the missing cookie in the request.

Request URI Request

The request and its parameters are defined in Section number 5 (Authorization Request) of OpenID4VP. Below normative details and references about the parameters to be used by the Wallet Instance in the request.

Request URI Endpoint Parameters

Parameter

Description

wallet_metadata

OPTIONAL. JSON object with metadata parameters. See OpenID4VP, Section 9.1 and the table below, "Wallet Metadata Parameters".

wallet_nonce

RECOMMENDED. String used by Wallet Instance to prevent replay of the RP's responses. See OpenID4VP, Section 9.
Wallet Metadata Parameters

Parameter

Description

presentation_definition_uri_supported

OPTIONAL. Boolean. When present it MUST be set to false, default is false.

vp_formats_supported

REQUIRED. Object with Credential format identifiers. See OpenID4VP Appendix B.

alg_values_supported

OPTIONAL. Array of cryptographic suites supported. See OpenID4VP Appendix B.

client_id_schemes_supported

RECOMMENDED. Array of Client Identifier schemes. Default is entity_id.

authorization_endpoint

URL of authorization server's endpoint. See OAUTH2, be this an universal link or a custom url-scheme.

response_types_supported

OPTIONAL. JSON array of OAuth 2.0 "response_type" values. If present it MUST be set to vp_token. Default is vp_token.

response_modes_supported

OPTIONAL. JSON array of OAuth 2.0 "response_mode" values. See JARM.

request_object_signing_alg_values_supported

OPTIONAL. See OpenID Connect Discovery.

Below a non-normative example of HTTP request made by the Wallet Instance to the Relying Party.

POST /request HTTP/1.1
Host: client.example.org
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

wallet_metadata%3D%7B%22authorization_endpoint%22%3A%20%22eudiw%3A%22%2C%20%22response_types_supported%22%3A%20%5B%22vp_token%22%5D%2C%20%22response_modes_supported%22%3A%20%5B%22form_post.jwt%22%5D%2C%20%22vp_formats_supported%22%3A%20%7B%22dc%2Bsd-jwt%22%3A%20%7B%22sd-jwt_alg_values%22%3A%20%5B%22ES256%22%2C%20%22ES384%22%5D%7D%7D%2C%20%22request_object_signing_alg_values_supported%22%3A%20%5B%22ES256%22%5D%2C%20%22presentation_definition_uri_supported%22%3A%20false%7D%2C%20wallet_nonce%3DqPmxiNFCR3QTm19POc8u

Note

The wallet_nonce parameter is RECOMMENDED for Wallet Instances that wants to prevent reply of their http requests to the Relying Parties. When present, the Relying Party MUST evaluate it.

Request Object Details

The Relying Party issues the signed Request Object using the content type set to application/oauth-authz-req+jwt, where a non-normative example in the form of decoded header and payload is shown below:

{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "typ": "oauth-authz-req+jwt",
  "kid": "9tjiCaivhWLVUJ3AxwGGz_9",
  "trust_chain": [
    "MIICajCCAdOgAwIBAgIC...awz",
    "MIICajCCAdOgAwIBAgIC...2w3",
    "MIICajCCAdOgAwIBAgIC...sf2"
  ]
}
.
{
  "client_id": "https://relying-party.example.org",
  "response_mode": "direct_post.jwt",
  "response_type": "vp_token",
  "dcql_query": {
    "credentials": [
      {
        "id": "personal id data",
        "format": "dc+sd-jwt",
        "meta": {
          "vct_values": [ "https://pidprovider.example.org/v1.0/personidentificationdata" ]
        },
        "claims": [
            {"path": ["given_name"]},
            {"path": ["family_name"]},
            {"path": ["personal_administrative_number"]}
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "wallet unit attestation",
        "format": "jwt",
        "claims": [
            {"path": ["iss"]},
            {"path": ["iat"]},
            {"path": ["cnf"]}
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "response_uri": "https://relying-party.example.org/response_uri",
  "nonce": "2c128e4d-fc91-4cd3-86b8-18bdea0988cb",
  "wallet_nonce": "qPmxiNFCR3QTm19POc8u",
  "state": "3be39b69-6ac1-41aa-921b-3e6c07ddcb03",
  "iss": "https://relying-party.example.org",
  "iat": 1672418465,
  "exp": 1672422065,
  "request_uri_method": "post"
}

The JWT header parameters are described below:

Name

Description

alg

Algorithm used to sign the JWT, according to [RFC 7516#section-4.1.1]. It MUST be one of the supported algorithms in Section Cryptographic Algorithms and MUST NOT be set to none or to a symmetric algorithm (MAC) identifier.

typ

Media Type of the JWT, as defined in [RFC 7519] and [RFC 9101]. It SHOULD be set to the value oauth-authz-req+jwt.

kid

Key ID of the public key needed to verify the JWT signature, as defined in [RFC 7517]. REQUIRED when trust_chain is used.

trust_chain

Sequence of Entity Statements that composes the Trust Chain related to the Relying Party, as defined in OID-FED Section 4.3 Trust Chain Header Parameter.

The JWT payload parameters are described herein:

Name

Description

client_id

Unique Identifier of the Relying Party.

response_mode

It MUST be set to direct_post.jwt.

dcql_query

Object representing a request for a presentation of Credentials, according to the DCQL query language defined in Section 6 of OpenID4VP.

response_type

It MUST be set to vp_token.

wallet_nonce

String value used to mitigate replay attacks of the response, as defined in Section 5.11 (Request URI Method) of OpenID4VP. It MUST be present if previously provided by Wallet Instance.

response_uri

The Response URI to which the Wallet Instance MUST send the Authorization Response using an HTTP request using the method POST.

nonce

Fresh cryptographically random number with sufficient entropy, which length MUST be at least 32 digits.

state

Unique identifier of the Authorization Request.

iss

The entity that has issued the JWT. It will be populated with the Relying Party client id.

iat

Unix Timestamp, representing the time at which the JWT was issued.

exp

Unix Timestamp, representing the expiration time on or after which the JWT MUST NOT be valid anymore.

request_uri_method

String determining the HTTP method to be used with the request_uri endpoint to provide the Wallet Instance metadata to the Relying Party. The value is case-insensitive and can be set to: get or post. The GET method, as defined in [@RFC9101], involves the Wallet Instance sending a GET request to retrieve a Request Object. The POST method involves the Wallet Instance requesting the creation of a new Request Object by sending an HTTP POST request, with its metadata, to the request URI of the Relying Party.

Warning

For security reasons and to prevent endpoint mix-up attacks, the value contained in the response_uri parameter MUST be one of those attested by a trusted third party, such as those provided in the openid_credential_verifier metadata within the response_uris parameter, obtained from the Trust Chain about the Relying Party.

Note

The following parameters, even if defined in [OID4VP], are not mentioned in the previous non-normative example, since their usage is conditional and may change in future release of this documentation.

  • presentation_definition: JSON object according to Presentation Exchange. This parameter MUST not be present when presentation_definition_uri or scope are present.

  • presentation_definition_uri: Not supported. String containing an HTTPS URL pointing to a resource where a Presentation Definition JSON object can be retrieved. This parameter MUST be present when presentation_definition parameter or a scope value representing a Presentation Definition is not present.

  • client_metadata: A JSON object containing the Relying Party metadata values. If the client_metadata parameter is present, the Wallet Instance MUST ignore it and consider the client metadata obtained through the OpenID Federation Trust Chain.

Request URI Endpoint Errors

When the Relying Party encounters errors while issuing the Request Object from the request_uri endpoint, the error responses defined in OpenID4VP, Section 7.5. (Error Response) are applicable.

The following is an example of an error response from request_uri endpoint:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json

{
 "error": "invalid_request",
 "error_description": "The request_uri is malformed or does not point to a valid Request Object."
}

Another example:

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Content-Type: application/json

{
 "error": "server_error",
 "error_description": "The request_uri cannot be retrieved due to an internal server error."
}

There are cases where the Wallet Instance cannot validate the Request Object or the Request Object results invalid. This error occurs if the Request Object is successfully fetched from the request_uri but fails validation checks by the Wallet Instance. This could be due to incorrect signatures, malformed claims, or other validation failures, such as the revocation of its issuer (Relying Party).

Upon receiving an error response, the Wallet Instance SHOULD inform the User of the error condition in an appropriate manner. Additionally, the Wallet Instance SHOULD log the error and MAY attempt to recover from certain errors if feasible. For example, if the error is server_error, the Wallet Instance MAY prompt the User to re-enter or scan a new QR code, if applicable.

Warning

The current OpenID4VP specification outlines various error responses that a Wallet Instance may return to the Relying Party (Verifier) in case of faulty requests. For privacy enhancement, Wallet Instances SHOULD NOT notify the Relying Party of faulty requests in certain scenarios. This is to prevent any potential misuse of error responses that could lead to gather informations that could be exploited.

Authorization Response Details

After getting the User authorization and consent for the presentation of the Credentials, the Wallet Instance sends the Authorization Response to the Relying Party response_uri endpoint, the content SHOULD be encrypted according OpenID4VP Section 7.3, using the Relying Party public key.

Note

Why the response is encrypted?

The response sent from the Wallet Instance to the Relying Party is encrypted to prevent a malicious agent from gaining access to the plaintext information transmitted within the Relying Party's network. This is only possible if the network environment of the Relying Party employs TLS termination. Such technique employs a termination proxy that acts as an intermediary between the client and the webserver and handles all TLS-related operations. In this manner, the proxy deciphers the transmission's content and either forwards it in plaintext or by negotiates an internal TLS session with the actual webserver's intended target. In the first scenario, any malicious actor within the network segment could intercept the transmitted data and obtain sensitive information, such as an unencrypted response, by sniffing the transmitted data.

Below a non-normative example of the request:

POST /response_uri HTTP/1.1
HOST: relying-party.example.org
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

response=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...9t2LQ

Below is a non-normative example of the decrypted payload of the JWT contained in the response, before base64url encoding. The vp_token parameter value corresponds to the format used when the DCQL query language is used in the presentation request.

{
  "state": "3be39b69-6ac1-41aa-921b-3e6c07ddcb03",
  "vp_token": {
      "personal id data": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...PT0iXX0",
      "wallet unit attestation": $WalletAttestation-JWT
  }
}

Where the following parameters are used:

Name

Description

vp_token

There MUST be at least two signed presentations in this Array:

  • The requested Digital Credential (one or more, in format of SD-JWT VC)

  • The Wallet Attestation

When presentation_definition is used, the vp_token value is a JSON Array containing the Verifiable Presentation(s) and the presentation_submission parameter MUST be also present within the response.

When the DCQL query language is used, the vp_token format is a JSON Object which keys corresponds to the requested credential ids in the dcql_query used in the request, and the values to each presented Digital Credential.

state

Unique identifier provided by the Relying Party within the Authorization Request.

SD-JWT Presentation

SD-JWT defines how an Holder can present a Credential to a Verifier proving the legitimate possession of the Credential. For doing this the Holder MUST include the KB-JWT in the SD-JWT, by appending the KB-JWT at the end of the of the SD-JWT, as represented in the example below:

<Issuer-Signed-JWT>~<Disclosure 1>~<Disclosure 2>~...~<Disclosure N>~<KB-JWT>

To validate the signature on the Key Binding JWT, the Verifier MUST use the key material included in the Issuer-Signed-JWT. The Key Binding JWT (KB-JWT) signature validation MUST use the public key included in the SD-JWT, using the cnf parameter contained in the Issuer-Signed-JWT.

When an SD-JWT is presented, its KB-JWT MUST contain the following parameters in the JWT header:

Claim

Description

typ

REQUIRED. MUST be kb+jwt, which explicitly types the Key Binding JWT as recommended in Section 3.11 of [RFC8725].

alg

REQUIRED. Signature Algorithm using one of the specified in the section Cryptographic Algorithms.

When an SD-JWT is presented, the KB-JWT signature MUST be verified by the same public key included in the SD-JWT within the cnf parameter. The KB-JWT MUST contain the following parameters in the JWT payload:

Claim

Description

iat

REQUIRED. The value of this claim MUST be the time at which the Key Binding JWT was issued, using the syntax defined in [RFC7519].

aud

REQUIRED. The intended receiver of the Key Binding JWT. The value of this parameter MUST match the Relying Party unique entity identifier.

nonce

REQUIRED. Ensures the freshness of the signature. The value type of this claim MUST be a string. The value MUST match with the one provided in the request object.

sd_hash

REQUIRED. The base64url-encoded hash digest over the Issuer-signed JWT and the selected disclosures.

Revocation Checks

The revocation mechanisms that the Relying Parties MUST implement are defined in the section (Revocations).

In the context of Digital Credential evaluation, any Relying Parties (RPs) establishes internal policies that define the meaning and value of presented Credentials. This is particularly important in scenarios where a Credential may be suspended but still holds value for certain purposes. For example, a suspended mobile driving license might still be valid for verifying the age of the holder.

The process begins with the RP requesting specific Credentials from the Holder. This request should align with the Relying Party's requirements and the context in which the Credentials will be used. The Holder then responds by releasing the requested Credentials.

Upon receiving the Credentials, the Relying Party evaluates their validity and value based on its internal policies. This evaluation considers the current status of the Credential (e.g., active, suspended, revoked) and the specific use case for which the Credential is being presented.

Relying Parties should develop comprehensive internal policies that outline how different types of Credentials are to be evaluated. These policies should address scenarios where a Credential may be partially valid or have limited applicability. Flexibility in evaluation processes is important to accommodate various use cases. For instance, a Credential that is suspended for driving purposes might still be acceptable for age verification.

Authorization Response Errors

When the Wallet sends a response using direct_post.jwt to the Relying Party, several errors may occur, including:

  • Invalid Credential: This error occurs when one or more Credentials or VPs, included in the vp_token, fail validation because they are malformed. The correct HTTP status code for this error is 400 (Bad Request). The error should be set to invalid_request, and the error_description SHOULD identify the malformed Credentials.

  • Issuer Credential Trust Failure: This error arises when the Relying Party cannot establish trust with the issuer of a presented Credential, included in the vp_token. The appropriate HTTP status code for this error is 403 (Forbidden). The error should be labeled as invalid_request, and the error_description SHOULD specify the issuer for which trust could not be established.

  • Invalid Nonce: This error happens when the nonce provided in the request is incorrect. The HTTP status code for this error should be 403 (Forbidden). The error SHOULD be labeled as invalid_request, with an error_description indicating that the nonce is incorrect.

  • Invalid Wallet Attestation: This error occours when it's not possible to establish trust with the Wallet Attestation's issuer (Wallet Provider), or if the Wallet Attestation is invalid or does not meet the Relying Party's minimum security criteria. The correct HTTP status code for this error is 403 (Forbidden). The error SHOULD be marked as invalid_request, and the error_description should clarify that the issue stems from the Wallet Attestation's failure to establish trust with its issuer or its non-compliance with required security standards.

  • Invalid Presentation Submission: This error occurs when the presentation submission is not valid. The appropriate HTTP status code for this error is 400 Bad Request. The error should be labeled as invalid_request, and the error_description should specify the invalid aspects of the presentation submission.

To enhance clarity and ensure proper error handling, it's crucial to provide detailed error responses. Below are two examples of HTTP responses using application/json that include both the error and error_description members:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "error": "invalid_request",
  "error_description": "Trust cannot be established with the issuer: https://issuer.example.com"
}

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "error": "invalid_request",
  "error_description": "The following Credentials/VP are malformed: [CredentialX, vp_token[2]]"
}

Redirect URI

As defined in Section 7.2. (Response Mode "direct_post") of the OpenID4VP specification, if the Response URI has successfully been processed, the Relying Party MUST respond with an HTTP status code of 200 and a JSON object in the response body containing the redirect_uri parameter. The Content-Type of the response SHOULD be set to application/json.

When the Relying Party provides the redirect URI, the Wallet Instance MUST redirect the user-agent to the location defined in the redirect URI. The redirect URI allows the Relying Party to continue the interaction with the End-User on the device where the Wallet Instance resides after the Wallet Instance has sent the Authorization Response to the response URI.

The Relying Party MUST include a response code within the redirect URI. The response code is a fresh, cryptographically random number used to ensure only the receiver of the redirect can fetch and process the Authorization Response. The number could be added as a path component, as a parameter or as a fragment to the URL. It is RECOMMENDED to use a cryptographic random value of 128 bits or more at the time of the writing of this specification.

The following is a non-normative example of the response from the Relying Party to the Wallet Instance upon receiving the Authorization Response at the Response Endpoint.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "redirect_uri": "https://relying-party.example.org/cb?response_code=091535f699ea575c7937fa5f0f454aee"
}

The redirect_uri value MUST be used with an HTTP method GET by either the Wallet Instance or the user-agent to redirect the User to a specific RP's endpoint in order to complete the process. The value can be added as a path component, as a fragment or as a parameter to the URL according to Section 6.2 of OpenID4VP. The specific entity that performs this action depends on whether the flow is Same device or Cross device.

Warning

For security reasons and to prevent endpoint mix-up attacks, the value contained in the redirect_uri parameter MUST be one of those attested by a trusted third party, such as those provided in the openid_credential_verifier metadata within the redirect_uris parameter, obtained from the Trust Chain about the Relying Party.

Redirect URI Errors

When the Wallet Instance sends the user-agent to the Redirect URI provided by the Relying Party, several errors may occur that prevent the successful completion of the process. These errors are critical as they directly impact the User experience by hindering the seamless flow of information between the Wallet Instance and the Relying Party. Below are potential errors related to the Redirect URI and their implications:

  • Mismatched Redirect URI: This error occurs when the Redirect URI provided by the Relying Party does not match any of the URIs linked with the User session. This mismatch can lead to a HTTP status error code set to 403 (Forbidden), indicating that the request cannot be processed due session/URI mismatch.

  • Redirect URI Security Issues: If the Relying Party incurs in security issues when evaluating the User session with the provided URI, the Relying Party MUST raise an error. In such cases, an HTTP status code set to 403 (Forbidden) MUST be returned, indicating that the request is valid but the server is refusing action due to security precautions.

Handling these errors requires clear communication to the User within the returned navigation web page. It is crucial for the Relying Party to implement robust error handling and validation mechanisms for Redirect URIs to ensure a secure implementation.